CVE-2026-67543

CVSS 8.8 (high) · published 2026-11-11

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Weakness: CWE-94, CWE-269

Source: NVD CVE-2026-67543

References

• https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5
• https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7
• https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70
• https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73
• https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73

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