ScreenConnect RMM+ extension flaw (CVE-2026-127063) and the SCKit attacks on MSPs

Updated 2026-11-15

Short answer: since 11 November 2026, attackers with access to managed service providers' ScreenConnect instances have used remote commands to install a second ScreenConnect client, which connects to their own server, and a toolkit called SCKit on customer endpoints (Microsoft, Huntress). ConnectWise says it has found no evidence that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability. The suspected entry point is the third-party RMM+ extension family, whose flaw is CVE-2026-127063 (CVSS 4.0 9.3). No fixed RMM+ version has been announced (ConnectWise). Separately, SCKit tries to spread from an infected endpoint to the technician who connects to it. ConnectWise says ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 and later block that technique with the fix for CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), released on 8 September 2026.

The two CVEs

CVEWhereScoreFixed
CVE-2026-127063Third-party RMM+ extension for ScreenConnect (DataComm)CVSS 4.0 9.3No fixed version announced. ConnectWise disabled it in cloud instances
CVE-2026-84869ScreenConnect client: file transfer and execution in an active session without authorization or host confirmationCVSS 3.1 9.9ScreenConnect 26.6.5, 8 September 2026. CISA KEV since 2026-09-11

CVE-2026-84869 is the "patched 9.9-rated flaw" in news reports about SCKit. Updating the server or cloud console does not update the clients on technician workstations, so ConnectWise says to check each one separately.

The RMM+ flaw: two descriptions

The CVE record, published by ConnectWise, says RMM+ "uses a static API secret by default", so environments that keep the default "may allow unauthorized access to extension API functionality, including the ability to send commands to managed agents". Huntress, quoted in ConnectWise's advisory, reports that RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured. In both cases the extension's command API is protected by its own passphrase rather than the technician's normal console sign-in (Microsoft). Huntress says this let commands bypass ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and MFA.

ConnectWise found about 400 partner environments with at least one RMM+ family extension. It says "the presence of these extensions alone does not establish compromise". The extensions it lists are Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. As a precaution it also disabled ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter in cloud environments and its marketplace. ConnectWise cannot disable extensions on on-premises servers.

What SCKit does

Huntress counted at least 288 endpoints in 48 organizations on 11 November, and 205 hosts in 41 organizations in a wave on 13 November. It had not seen the technician spread work: "We have not observed that method to spread work successfully."

Check (read-only)

On the ScreenConnect server, the Extensions page under Administration lists installed extensions, and Administration, Overview shows the server version (ConnectWise). On customer endpoints and technician workstations, run in PowerShell:

Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match 'ScreenConnect|UpdateConnect' } | Select-Object Name, State, PathName
Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*', 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*' | Where-Object DisplayName -like 'ScreenConnect*' | Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion
Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName TrapWatch -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Test-Path 'C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap'
Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' -Name RelayTrapLiteAlert -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
netsh interface portproxy show all

The first command lists ScreenConnect client services with their command lines, which include the relay host each client connects to. A second client, or one that points to a host you do not run, is what the attackers install. Huntress saw a rogue service posing as "Windows Update Agent" that runs UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe, and a portproxy redirect from 127.0.0.1:88. The second command shows installed client versions; a version below 26.6.5 lacks the CVE-2026-84869 fix.

Published indicators

TypeIndicator (defanged)
IP addresses185.99.255[.]28, 155.94.150[.]39
Domainsns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org
Filessckit-run.bat, sckit-decoder.ps1, TrapWatch.ps1, Run-Lateral-Full.bat, runnew.cmd, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, %TEMP%\sckit-*
Rogue client IDs2588ef5c15954b10, ed630cc2c873b091
Account namesAddmin, rmmserver

ConnectWise: "An absence of matches does not rule out compromise." ConnectWise and Huntress both say not to investigate a suspected endpoint by connecting to it through ScreenConnect; use EDR or another out-of-band tool.

FixLane pages: ScreenConnect panels breached to push rogue remote access tools, RMM+ extension accepts a blank access key.

Questions

Is ScreenConnect itself vulnerable?

ConnectWise says it found no evidence of a compromise of its infrastructure or that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability. The suspected entry is the third-party RMM+ extension (CVE-2026-127063). Clients older than 26.6.5 also lack the CVE-2026-84869 fix that blocks SCKit's spread to technicians.

Which ScreenConnect version do technician clients need?

26.6.5 or later, released on 8 September 2026 with the fix for CVE-2026-84869. ConnectWise says a console update does not update technician clients, so check each workstation.

Is there a fixed RMM+ version?

No. ConnectWise's disclosure for CVE-2026-127063 says no fixed RMM+ version has been announced and that disabling the extension is the current mitigation.

Did the attack spread to technicians?

Huntress says it has not observed the technician spread succeed, and the console takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log it checked.

Sources

Check your own machine

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