Updated 2026-11-15
Short answer: SignDrop is a local privilege escalation exploit for the Windows Common Log File System driver (clfs.sys). It lets a standard user get SYSTEM. Researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, known as Nightmare Eclipse, published it on GitHub on 10 November 2026. As of 15 November 2026 there is no patch and no CVE. Microsoft's November 2026 security release has no CLFS entry, and NVD has no CVE that mentions SignDrop. Microsoft told SecurityWeek it is investigating, that Microsoft Defender detects and blocks exploitation, and that it has not observed exploitation in the wild.
The flaw is in the CLFS log file authentication mitigation itself. That mitigation adds authentication codes to CLFS log files and keeps a .cnpf patch file next to each one (Microsoft). According to Naceri, when a log file is opened, any container associated with it is opened too, and CLFS signs an empty container even if a signature file already exists. Access checks are correct for the user who sets up the log. But a standard user can make Microsoft Defender open the log through its signature update RPC interface. The .cnpf file is then created as SYSTEM, at a path the attacker chose, with the original file's permissions. The proof of concept uses this to spawn a SYSTEM shell. Naceri says the same trick can bypass the self-protection of other antimalware engines, because the file request comes from the engine's own process.
Naceri tested SignDrop on Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental and Windows Server 2025 Experimental, and estimates that 80% of Windows installations are vulnerable. Whether a machine is affected depends on the mode of the CLFS authentication mitigation:
| Mode value | Meaning (Microsoft) | SignDrop (Naceri) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Mitigation enforced; set automatically after 90 days | Vulnerable |
| 1 | Learning mode | Vulnerable |
| 2 | Disabled by an administrator | Not vulnerable |
| 3 | Disabled automatically by the system | Not vulnerable |
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication" /v Mode winver Get-HotFix | Sort-Object InstalledOn -Descending | Select-Object -First 5
The first command prints the mitigation mode from the table above. winver and Get-HotFix show the Windows build and the latest installed updates, which is useful once Microsoft ships a fix. Naceri also suggests running his proof of concept as a test. That executes exploit code, so it is not a read-only check and is not covered here.
Naceri says that disabling the mitigation would expose machines to the CLFS memory corruption bugs it was built to stop, and that the only solution is to wait for a patch from Microsoft.
The October 2026 Patch Tuesday fixed five CLFS driver CVEs: CVE-2026-70233, CVE-2026-83835, CVE-2026-85355, CVE-2026-85868 and CVE-2026-85870. Microsoft marked none of them as exploited or publicly disclosed. They predate SignDrop and do not fix it. The November release is covered in Patch Tuesday November 2026.
FixLane pages: Windows SignDrop zero-day, CLFS SignDrop via Defender.
Not as of 15 November 2026. Microsoft's November 2026 release (10 November) has no CLFS fix, and Microsoft told SecurityWeek it is investigating and will update impacted products.
No CVE had been assigned as of 15 November 2026. NVD has no entry that mentions SignDrop.
Microsoft told SecurityWeek it had not observed exploitation in the wild. Cyderes compiled and tested the proof of concept and found no evidence of attacks, according to SecurityWeek.
Read the Mode value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication. Naceri says 0 or 1 means vulnerable and 2 or 3 means not vulnerable.
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